In this note we consider the non-cooperative linear feedback Nash quadratic differential game with an infinite planning horizon for descriptor systems of index one. The performance function is assumed to be indefinite. We derive both necessary and sufficient conditions under which this game has a Nash equilibrium.
Introduction
In the last decades, there is an increased interest in studying diverse problems in economics and optimal control theory using dynamic games. In particular in environmental economics and macroeconomic policy coordination, dynamic games are a natural framework to model policy coordination problems (see e.g. the books and references in Dockner et al. [8] , Jørgensen et al. [22] , Plasmans et al. [32] and Grass et al. [19] ). Moreover, in optimal control theory it is well-known that, e.g., the issue to obtain robust control strategies can be approached as a dynamic game problem (see e.g. [2] , [26] and [5] ).
In this paper we consider the linear quadratic differential game under the assumption that the dynamics of the underlying process are described by a descriptor system. That is, by both a set of differential equations and linear equations. Problems of this kind appear in studying systems which operate under different timescales like e.g. in mechanical engineering where an electrically driven robot manipulator typically has slow mechanical dynamics and fast electrical dynamics, or in environmental economics where global warming is assumed to be a system which has slow dynamics that is affected by various processes that have fast dynamics. They also sometimes naturally appear in modeling systems like e.g. the Leontieff model in economics describing the relationship between the levels of production of a number of interrelated production sectors. See e.g. [27] , [21] or [20] and the references therein.
The "one-player" regulator problem for descriptor systems that have index one has been considered by many authors. One of the first who considered this control problem was Pandolfi [30] . His results were later on generalized by e.g. Cobb [7] who gave both necessary and sufficient conditions under which the regular definite control problem has a solution in terms of a transformed system. In the seminal paper [4] Bender and Laub show, amongst other things, by considering the stable eigenspace of a generalized eigenvalue problem that the (generally non-unique) optimal feedback gains are constrained to lie in a linear variety, all of which yield the same minimal cost of (1) . Unfortunately, however, this approach does not render itself to be generalized to a multi-player context with a feedback information structure. In [12] an explicit characterization was obtained for this set of optimal feedback gains in terms of a transformed system, which make it possible to extend results for a multi-player context. The reason to consider index one descriptor systems is that, see e.g. [17] (or references cited there), for all initial states of the system there exists a smooth control that generates a smooth state trajectory if and only if the system is controllable at infinity (or, impulse controllable). Further, all impulsive modes of the system can be transformed then into finite dynamic modes using a static state feedback control. After this transformation the system has then the property of being of index one (which will be formally introduced in section 2). Since we do not want to consider impulsive control actions in this paper we will therefore restrict our attention to impulse controllable systems, or without loss of generality, to systems that are of index one.
In this note we consider the linear quadratic differential game under a feedback information structure. The reason to consider this information structure is that the corresponding linear feedback Nash equilibria (FBNE) have the nice property of strong time consistency. A property which, e.g., does not hold under an open-loop information structure.
The case that the system is just described by a set of differential equations has been considered by many authors and dates back to the seminal work of Starr and Ho in [33] . For the fixed finite planning horizon, one can show that there exists at most one FBNE (see e.g. [28] , [31] ). For the infinite planning horizon it is well-known that the problem may have up to an infinite number of FBNE. References and related issues can be found in, e.g., [3] and [9] .
For descriptor systems having an open-loop information structure in [10] the general multi-person game problem for index one systems was solved. Further, in [11] some first results were obtained for higher order index systems.
Probably the first reference where in fact descriptor systems were considered with a feedback information structure within the context of singularly perturbed systems is [16] (see also [15] for the zero-sum case). For descriptor systems with a closed-loop perfect state information structure Xu and Mizukami [34] derived for a finite planning horizon some first results for zero-sum games. Further, these authors considered the leader-follower information structure in [29] and [35] . Glizer [18] considered the asymptotic behavior of the zero-sum game solution from a cheap control perspective. As already mentioned above Engwerda et al. [12] solved the general multi-person game problem where the solvability conditions are posed in terms of a transformed system. However, the results were obtained under the simplifying assumption that the state cost are nonnegative. In particular this implies that the results obtained there are not directly applicable to a zero-sum game setting. In this paper we generalize these feedback results for performance criteria that also include "cross-terms", i.e. products of the state and control variables and with no definiteness assumptions concerning the involved state cost. We provide a complete parametrization of all Nash solutions. As a special case we derive existence results for the zero-sum game. Performance criteria of this type often naturally appear in economic policy making.
The outline of this note is as follows. Section two introduces the problem and contains some preliminary results. The main results of this paper are stated in Section three, whereas Section four illustrates the presented theory with an example. The final section contains some concluding remarks.
Preliminaries
In this paper we assume that player i = 1, 2 likes to minimize:
, and x(t) satisfies the linear differential equation
Notice that we make no definiteness assumptions w.r.t. matrix Q i . Next, we recall some standard definitions and results concerning descriptor systems. Consider the system
where rank(E) = r < n. An initial state x 0 in (3) is called consistent if with this choice of the initial state the system has a solution. Let λ be any complex number. Then, system (3) (or the matrix pair (E, A)) is called regular if det(λE − A) = 0. System (3) has a unique solution, for any consistent initial state, if and only if (E, A) is regular. The solutions of |λE − A| = 0 are called the finite eigenvalues of (E, A), and the corresponding (generalized) eigenvectors are exponential modes of the system. From [14] we recall the so-called Weierstrass canonical form. 
where A 1 is a matrix in Jordan form, N is a nilpotent matrix also in Jordan form and I is the identity matrix. A 1 and N are unique up to permutation of Jordan blocks.
From (4) we have that λE−A = Y −T diag{λI−A 1 , λN −I}X −1 . Since λN −I = −λ(µI−N), µ = λ −1 and N is nilpotent, one says that λN −I describes the eigenstructure at ∞ (or the infinite eigenvalues) of the pencil λE − A. Notice that in case we consider the system
where ǫ > 0 and N = 0, there exist initial states that grow arbitrarily fast in time if ǫ → 0. Moreover, if we consider in (5) ǫ = 1, N = 0 1 0 0 and x 2 (0) = [1 0] T , we observe that the solution of the second part of the system has to jump to x 2 (t) = [0 0] T , for all t > 0. For these reasons system (3) is said to create impulsive modes if there exist generalized eigenvectors, x k , satisfying the relations Ex 1 = 0 and Ex k = x k−1 (k ≥ 2). System (3) has no impulsive modes if and only if N = 0 or, equivalently, rank E = deg |λE − A|. Further, system (3) is said to be of index one 1 if N = 0 (its degree of nilpotency is one). Next recall from, e.g., [17] that for all initial states in (2) there exists a smooth control that generates a smooth state trajectory if and only if (2) is controllable at infinity (or, impulse controllable 2 ). Further, all impulsive modes of (2) can be transformed then into finite dynamic modes using static state feedback control. Since we do not want to consider impulsive control actions in this paper we restrict our attention to impulse controllable systems. As we consider the state feedback control problem this motivates why we may assume for our problem, without loss of generality, that the matrix pair (E, A) in (2) is index one. Under this index one assumption, with
and B i1 := [I r 0]Y T B i and B i2 := [0 I n−r ]Y T B i , the performance function J i in (1) can be rewritten as follows:
and the system as
Of course problem (7, 8) is not completely specified, as we did not specify the set of admissible feedback strategies yet and neither paid attention to the fact that not for every initial state a solution exists of (8) . The set of all consistent initial states of (3) is given by [24] this set does not depend on the choice of matrix X that is chosen in (4). In the sequel we will assume that if
As shown in
T 2 ] T is an inconsistent initial state of (4), the system's state will jump to x + 0 := X[x T 1 0] T . This assumption is motivated by the idea that the part of the state of the system that is governed by the fast dynamics of the system can, compared to the part of the state governed by the slow dynamics, easily adapt. We will restrict the analysis to the set of linear state feedback controls that stabilize the system for all consistent initial states. A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of such a stabilizing feedback matrix is that system (2) . These requirements lead then to the assumption that F ∈ F , where
We assume that the matrix pairs (A 1 , B i1 ), i = 1, 2, are stabilizable. So, in principle, each player is capable to stabilize the first part of the transformed system on his own. Notice furthermore from the above discussion (and the fact that for any fixed matrix F ∈ F , matrix G :
Notice that the assumption that the players use simultaneously stabilizing controls introduces the cooperative meta-objective of both players to stabilize the system (see e.g. [9] for a discussion).
Then, u * := (u * 1 , u * 2 ) ∈ F is called a feedback Nash equilibrium if the usual inequalities apply, i.e., no player can improve his performance by a unilateral deviation from this set of equilibrium actions. Introducing the notation u * −i (α) := u * where u * i has been replaced by the arbitrary input function α the formal definition reads as follows
So, summarizing, the main problem addressed in this paper reads as follows.
Problem 1: Consider the performance criterion (1) and system (2), where rank(E) = r < n = dim(x). Assume (E, A) is regular and has index one; and (E, A, B) is finite dynamics stabilizable. Let X be as defined in (4) . Decompose X =: [X 1 X 2 ], with X 1 ∈ IR n×r and X 2 ∈ IR n×(n−r) Find conditions under which (1,2) has a FBN solution u i = F i x, with F ∈ F .
To solve Problem 1 we first state some preliminary results. The following Lemma 2.3 can be found in [12] . Lemma 2.3 Assume (E, A + BF ) is regular and has index one. Then for all F ∈ F , G :
Furthermore we recall from, e.g., [6, p.97] the following property. Lemma 2.4 Assume C ∈ IR n×m and D ∈ IR m×n . Then the following holds:
is finite dynamics stabilizable if there exists a feedback u(t) = F x(t) such that all finite eigenvalues of the system Eẋ(t) = (A + BF )x(t) are stable. 4 l C + 0 is the set of complex numbers with non-negative real part.
The following lemma can be proved directly from the definition of Nash equilibrium.
is a FBN for the game defined by the cost J i (F 1 H, F 2 H) and the systemẋ(t)
is a FBN for the game defined by the cost J i (G 1 , G 2 ) and the systemẋ(t)
Finally, we recall from [13] the following result.
is invertible. Then the differential game (1, 2) , with E = I, has a feedback Nash equilibrium (F 1 , F 2 ) for every initial state if and only if
Here (K 1 , K 2 ) are a symmetric stabilizing solution of the coupled algebraic Riccati equations
Main results
To solve Problem 1 we first notice from (8), using Lemma 2.3, and our jump assumption on inconsistent initial states, that for all t > 0
Substitution of this into (7, 8) shows that Problem 1 has a FBNE if and only if (F 1 , F 2 ) is a FBNE for the problem with
andẋ
IntroducingF i := F i X I H , we can rewrite (13, 14) above as
subject toẋ
Next notice that, by Lemma 2.4,
Using (17) we can rewrite (15) as follows
wherẽ
We now have the following result. is invertible and the matricesR ii > 0, i = 1, 2.
Then (F 1 , F 2 ) is a FBN for (1,2) for every initial state if and only if
and (F 1 ,F 2 ) are given by
where (K 1 , K 2 ) are a symmetric stabilizing solution of the coupled algebraic Riccati equations
Proof: From the above reformulation it follows directly from Lemma 2.5 that (F 1 , F 2 ) is a FBN for (1,2) for every initial state if and only if (F 1 ,F 2 ) is a FBN for the game defined by the cost (18) and system (16) and (F 1 , F 2 ) solve the set of equationsF i := F i X I H . From, e.g. [1, p.295] , we have that this equation always has a solution and that all solutions are parameterized by (19) . Further, by Theorem 2.6 we have that (F 1 ,F 2 ) is a FBN for every initial state for the game defined by the cost (18) and system (16) if and only if (20) holds where (K 1 , K 2 ) are a stabilizing solution of (21, 22) .
is full column rank, the Moore-Penrose inverse P + of P equals
Remark 3.3 For the zero-sum game, i.e. J 1 = −J 2 , we obtain by addition of (21) and (22) (followed by some elementary rewriting) that K i satisfy the equation
Since A cl is a stable matrix it follows from this linear matrix equation that necessarily K 1 + K 2 = 0. So we have that K 2 = −K 1 . Substitution of this into (21) and (22) shows that these equations have a stabilizing solution if and only if the equation
. SinceR 11 is invertible one can use, e.g., the expression for the inverse of a block matrix (see e.g. [23, p.656]) to verify that for the inverse matrixG −1 =:
is clearly symmetric too. So (23) is an ordinary Riccati equation, which we know has at most one stabilizing solution. Therefore, if the zero-sum game has a solution, then the equilibrium actions (F 1 ,F 2 ) are unique and given by
.
So from (19) we have that the set of equilibrium strategies for the zero-sum game (1,2) is
Remark 3.4 [16] considered convergence of the feedback Nash solution of the singularly perturbed systemẋ are A 1 = 0, B i1 = 3, B i2 = 1,Q i = 3 2 ,Ṽ i = 0,W i = 0,R ii = 3,R ij = 4, j = i, andÑ i = 2, i = 1, 2. Straightforward calculations show that the set of FBN for this game are (see (19) ):
It is easily verified that F * i does not belong to this class of FBN solutions. So, this example demonstrates that in general the FBN strategies of the singularly perturbed system do not converge to a FBN strategy of the corresponding reduced order system. This, though the fast dynamics in the singularly perturbed system are stable (i.e. A 22 = −2 < 0). The example presented below in Section 4 shows that there are also cases where, independent of the stability properties of the fast dynamics, always convergence occurs.
An Example
In this section we illustrate the obtained results in a small example. We consider the following dynamic equationsḟ
with revenue functionsJ
The example might be interpreted along the following lines. Consider a ranger who has to take care about the fish stock in a lake. The lake is fed by a river. Upstream the river there is a firm who wants to dump some of its waste into the river. The waste, however, has the property that it contains a product which spreads quickly in the water and from which cause the fish to die. Both the ranger and the firm know this. The firm has a license to dump some of its waste into the river provided the pollution is not getting too excessive in the sense that the fish stock will get below its natural equilibrium value (which is set to 0 here for ease of calculations). In the above model the fish stock (above its natural equilibrium value) is represented by the variable f , the fishing by the ranger by u 1 (a negative value can be interpreted as planting fish into the lake), the waste dropped into the river by u 2 (a negative value can be interpreted as efforts undertaken by the firm to clean the river again) and p the amount of pollution. It is assumed that the negative effect of pollution on the growth of the fish stock is proportional to p. The ranger is paid for the number of hours he spends on keeping the fish stock of the lake near its equilibrium value. The quadratic structure of the revenues for the ranger could be motivated by the fact that if the fish stock is far from its equilibrium it will cost him much more time to fix everything again. Introducing x T (t) := [f (t) p(t)], we can rewrite the above model (24, 25) as Elementary calculations show that with Y T := −1 
, where k i solve the equations (19) is given by (with z i , s i ∈ IR):
In case k 2 = 0 this can be simplified as
That is, geometrically, all equilibrium feedback matrices F i are located on a line throughF i P + which is perpendicular to the line λP, λ ∈ IR. We illustrate this in Figure 1 . In the Appendix it is shown that depending on the choice of parameters either zero up to three different equilibria can occur.
In the rest of this example we will concentrate on the case that τ f = β 2 , where just one equilibrium occurs. From the Appendix we have that under this assumption (k 1 , k 2 ) = ( −α 2 β 3 , 8α 2 βτp From (30) it follows then that
So the closed-loop dynamics, using this choice of F i , are determined by an initial amount of pollution of p 0 = − −8 3 βλ 2 α+λ 2 −α f 0 = 8 3 βf 0 followed by a decline of pollution and a return to its natural equilibrium of the fish stock along the trajectories p(t) = 8 3 βf (t), where f (t) = e − 4 3 t f 0 . In the Appendix also the feedback Nash equilibria are determined in case ǫ = 0. In particular it is shown there that the corresponding equilibrium costs coincide with the above formulae in the limiting case (ǫ ↓ 0). Furthermore the limiting equilibrium actions are obtained by choosing λ 1 = 1 8 and λ 2 = − τ p in (31) above. So, the ranger will be just planting fish in this equilibrium and the firm's dumping of waste depends positively on the fish stock and negatively on the amount of pollution.
To analyze the question which choice of λ i in (31) might provide some additional robustness properties, we next consider the cost if one uses the equilibrium actions F i from (31) to control system (24, 25) if ǫ = 0. Then the system dynamics are described by
Notice that this system is stable iff λ 2 < 0 and λ 2 ǫ + β(1 
The question which control strategy will be chosen by the players, depends on the additional objectives of the players. If they don't have any additional objectives it seems reasonable that ultimately the λ i parameters are such that a Nash equilibrium occurs. That is, each player i tries to maximizeJ i w.r.t. λ i , assuming a fixed value for the other player. If, e.g., p 0 = 0, this would result in solving for the ranger the equation ∂H 1 (1,1) ∂λ 1 = 0 and for the firm ∂H 2 (1,1) ∂λ 2 = 0. This yields, with λ 1 := 8λ 1 − 1, the set of simultaneous equations ǫβ(λ 1 + 4) 2 + 6λ 2λ1 = 0 8ǫβλ 2 (λ 1 + 4) + 12λ 2 2 − 3τ p (λ 1 + 4) = 0, under the (stability) constraint thatλ 1 > 0. The solution of the above set of equations is given by λ 2 = − ǫβ(λ 1 +4) 2 6λ 1 whereλ 1 is the (unique) positive solution of the equation −3λ 3 1 − (20 + 9 ǫ 2 β 2τ p )λ 2 1 − 16λ 1 + 64 = 0.
Notice that in the limiting case, ǫ ↓ 0, this leads again to the solution λ 1 = 1 8 , λ 2 = − τ p . From a robustness point of view another option could be that players like to choose the λ i in such a way that the closed-loop system becomes as stable as possible. Or, stated differently, to determine λ i in such a way that the real part of the largest eigenvalue of matrix A ǫ , λ(λ 1 , λ 2 ) := 1 2
is minimal. Fist notice that for fixed λ i , lim ǫ↓0 λ(λ 1 , λ 2 ) = − 4 3 β. Choosing for a fixed negative λ 2 , λ 1 such that 1 + 8
ǫ . So, in case players would agree to coordinate their actions, as far as it concerns the choice of the λ i parameters, we see that this largest eigenvalue can be made arbitrarily small by an appropriate choice of λ i . A clear disadvantage of this choice is that its implementation requires knowledge of ǫ. Furthermore, it easily results in high gain feedbacks.
On the other hand we see that if the ranger chooses
. So, in case it is unclear what the value of ǫ will be and, moreover, the ranger doesn't know the firm's choice of λ 2 , the ranger can enforce always a certain stability of the closedloop system. In this case the ranger considers both the fish stock and the level of pollution in his decision how much he should fish. This at the expense that he might have earned more profits (for small values of ǫ) or that, in retrospect, a more stabilizing control could have been implemented if he would have known the firm's action.
Concluding Remarks
In this note we considered the regular indefinite infinite-planning horizon linear-quadratic differential game for index one descriptor systems. Both necessary conditions and sufficient conditions were derived for the existence of a feedback Nash equilibrium. These conditions were stated in terms of a transformed system. A complete parametrization was derived for the set of FBN equilibria. The transformation used here was based on the Weierstrass canonical form. Notice, however, that for numerical purposes it suffices to make a singular value decomposition of matrix E. Using this, one can calculate then easily matrices Y and X yielding the same structural form (18) , with matrix A 1 a square matrix instead of a Jordan matrix (see [12, Remark 3.2] ).
In case there exists a FBN equilibrium, usually, there exists an infinite number of feedback Nash equilibria which all give rise to the same closed-loop behavior of the system due to the informational non-uniqueness of the problem. This makes it possible to look for equilibria within this set that satisfy some additional properties, like e.g. robustness. We illustrated in an example how different criteria may yield different choices for the feedback design. In particular we showed that in this example one of these equilibria can be interpreted as the converged FBN of the corresponding singular perturbed system. By means of a counterexample (based on [16] ) we showed that this property does not hold for arbitrary systems. Furthermore we showed that in this example one of the players can enforce a certain stability of the closed-loop system for the corresponding singularly perturbed system by an appropriate choice of his strategy, this independent of the FBN strategy choice of the other player and independent of the time-scale of the fast system. Clearly these observations ask for a more detailed study in a more general setting.
The obtained theoretical results can be generalized straightforwardly to the N-player case. Furthermore, since Q i are allowed to be indefinite, the obtained results were used directly to derive properties for the zero-sum game. We showed that in that case all FBN equilibria yield the same closed-loop system. From, e.g. [9] [Theorem 8.5], we recall that the feedback Nash equilibria u i (t) = F i x(t) for this game are given by F * i := −R −1 iiB T i K i , i = 1, 2, where (K 1 , K 2 ) are a set of symmetric solutions of the next coupled algebraic Riccati equations
that satisfy the additional requirement that the closed-loop system matrix A cl :
iiB T i . Moreover, the cost incurred by player i by playing this equilibrium action is x T 0 K i x 0 , i = 1, 2.
With
k 2k3 an elementary spelling of equations (32, 33) yields the next equations
Introducing next r := k 2 + 1, s := α −k 3 ǫ , v := k 1 − β,τ p := α 2 − τ p andτ f := β 2 − τ f we can rewrite the above set of equations as
. Notice that both eigenvalues of A cl are stable iff.
Now, first consider the case v = 0. Then from (37) it follows thatk 2 = 0 and therefore the eigenvalues of A cl are not stable. So this case does not provide an appropriate solution.
Next consider the case v = 0. Then from (37) it follows thatk 1 = −k 2 2 2vǫ 2 . From (38) it follows next that eitherk 2 = 0 or s = ǫv − rk 2 2vǫ . In casek 2 = 0, it follows thatk 1 = 0 too, and (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) 
Since the eigenvalues of A cl must be stable it follows that v = τ f , s = − τ p , r = − β+ s ǫ v− s ǫ and k 3 = ǫ 2s (r 2 − 1) is an appropriate solution provided the conditionsτ f > 0 andτ p > 0 hold. Next, consider the case thatk 1 = −k 2 2 2vǫ 2 and s = ǫv − rk 2 2ǫv . Then, (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) 
In case s = 0 it follows from (40) that v > 0 and rk 2 < 0, which violates the condition that 0 = s = ǫv − rk 2 2ǫv . So, we may assume in the following s = 0. In case r = 1, by (47), necessarily k 3 = 0. However, it is easily verified from (45) and (46) that the case k 3 = 0 does not provide an appropriate solution too.
So, w.l.o.g., we may assume that both r = 1 and s = 0. Now, introduce w := ǫv. By (47),
2s . Substitution into (46) gives:
Substitution of, first, s 2 from (48) and, next, s = w − rk 2 2w into the above expression yields then k 2 (4r 2 − (4 + ǫβ w )r − 1) − 2τ p (r − 1) + 2w(rw + ǫβ) = 0.
From (45) it follows thatk 2 =τ f ǫ 2 −w 2 2(r−1) . Substitution ofk 2 into the above equality and some elementary calculations show then that the next equality must hold (τ f ǫ 2 − w 2 )(4wr 2 − (4w + ǫβ)r − w) − 4w(r − 1) 2τ p + 4(r − 1)w 2 (rw + ǫβ) = 0. Which can be rewritten as
Furthermore, substitution ofk 2 into (48) and some elementary rewriting shows that (48) can be rewritten as
So (45-48) has an appropriate solution iff. (49,50) has a solution (r, w) satisfying the conditions i) rk 2 2w > 0 and ii) w 2 + 1 2 rk 2 < 0, wherek 2 =τ f ǫ 2 −w 2 2(r−1) .
Case τ f = β 2
From the above reasoning it follows that the game has an equilibrium iff. (49,50) has a solution (r, w) satisfying the conditions i) and ii). Substitution of τ f = β 2 into this shows that the next conditions should hold w 3 + ǫβ(5r − 4)w 2 − 4τ p (r − 1) 2 w = 0, (51) (3r − 4) 2 16(r − 1) 2 w 2 −τ p = 0,
where (r, w) has the properties that i) rk 2 2w > 0 and ii) w 2 + 1 2 rk 2 < 0, withk 2 = −w 2 2(r−1) . From (52) it is clear that this set of equations has a solution only ifτ p ≥ 0. Since the conditions i) and ii) imply in particular that w < 0 it follows, moreover, that w = − τ p |4(r−1)| |3r−4| , unless r = 4 3 and τ p = 0. In case r = 4 3 , w 2 + 1 2 rk 2 = 0, which violates condition ii). So, if r = 4 3 there is no equilibrium. Recall that v = 0 did not provide a solution. Therefore, w = 0, and it follows from (51) that
Moreover, i) and ii) hold iff. 1 < r < 4 3 . Substitution of w 2 into (53) gives after some elementary calculations that w also satisfies
Combining (53) , where x(t) satisfies the differential equationẋ(t) = (Ã +B 1 F 1 +B 2 F 2 )x(t), x(0) = x 0 . Notice that this system is stable iff λ 2 < 0 and λ 2 ǫ + β(1 + 8 3 λ 1 ) < 0. Furthermore,J
where W 1 := β 2 (1 − 64 9 λ 2 1 ) βλ 1 3 (8λ 1 − 1)
and W 2 := − 64 9 β 2 λ 2 2 8 3 βλ 2 (λ 2 − α)
where H i is the unique solution of the linear matrix equation 
Straightforward calculations show that

